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1A Novel Sequence Generation Approach to
Diagnose Faults in Reconfigurable Scan
Networks
Riccardo Cantoro, Member, IEEE, Aleksa Damljanovic, Student Member, IEEE,
Matteo Sonza Reorda, Fellow, IEEE, and Giovanni Squillero, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—With the complexity of nanoelectronic devices rapidly increasing, an efficient way to handle large number of embedded
instruments became a necessity. The IEEE 1687 standard was introduced to provide flexibility in accessing and controlling such
instrumentation through a reconfigurable scan chain. Nowadays, together with testing the system for defects that may affect the scan
chains themselves, the diagnosis of such faults is also important. This article proposes a method for generating stimuli to precisely
identify permanent high-level faults in a IEEE 1687 reconfigurable scan chain: the system is modeled as a finite state automaton where
faults correspond to multiple incorrect transitions; then, a dynamic greedy algorithm is used to select a sequence of inputs able to
distinguish between all possible faults. Experimental results on the widely-adopted ITC’02 and ITC’16 benchmark suites, as well as on
synthetically generated circuits, clearly demonstrate the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed approach: generated
sequences are two orders of magnitude shorter compared to previous methodologies, while the computational resources required
remain acceptable even for larger benchmarks.
Index Terms—Diagnosis, Reconfigurable Scan Networks, IEEE Std 1687, Finite State Machines
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1 INTRODUCTION
The complexity of the devices designed in recent years
has been increasing significantly. Together with resources
that back up the device functionality, a large number of
auxiliary resources is embedded within the generic device to
support different purposes, such as calibration, test, moni-
toring and debug. These additional resources are sometimes
referred to as on-chip instruments. For example, using logic
or memory BIST to perform test at the end of manufac-
turing, or during the device’s operational life, may require
some initialization values and results eventually need to
be retrieved, while sensors for measuring and monitoring
voltage and temperature across the device often have to be
configured before acquiring the data. Hence, data transfers
are required between the outside and the instruments, and
different solutions have been devised to support them, e.g.,
by resorting to IEEE 1149.1 or IEEE 1500.
Exacerbated by the increasing number of instruments
within a single scan chain, the lack of flexibility is a major
issue in both IEEE 1149.1 boundary-scan (JTAG) and IEEE
1500 core test standards, along with weaknesses of the test
scheduling and scalability limitations. The new IEEE 1687
standard (IJTAG) [1] was designed to be able to deal with
problems caused by the long scan chains and the substantial
number of instructions required to access instruments. It
exploits the idea of Reconfigurable Scan Networks (RSNs),
allowing a scan chain to be partitioned into segments that
can be selectively included or excluded. Through dynamic
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configuration and variable-length scan-chain, IJTAG enables
flexible and efficient access to all instruments. Thus, design-
ers are able to take into account various configurations and
choose the best trade-off between parameters such as area
or access time. Although the standard does not impose an
external access mechanism, the most widely accepted one is
the IEEE 1149.1 Test Access Port (TAP).
To interface all on-chip instruments, special Test Data
Registers (TDRs) are incorporated into the network. They are
similar to those found in boundary-scan and include some
additional control logic, depending on write/read capabil-
ity. Two special reconfigurable modules, namely Segment
Insertion Bits and Scan Multiplexers, are used to support
dynamic configuration: users can change the configuration
of the network by programming ScanMux and SIB modules,
choosing which sub-set of instruments has to remain acces-
sible; then, they can write or read the flip-flops belonging
to the currently active segments. As a result, faster and
more efficient access is provided. The IEEE 1687 standard
introduces two languages: Instrument Connectivity Language
and Procedural Description Language that allow describing
the structure of the network and the protocol to access the
different instruments.
To provide correct access to all instruments embedded
within the device, guaranteeing that the network will be-
have as expected is absolutely crucial. In other words,
possible defects affecting the network should be identified.
This includes testing the ability to configure the network in
a proper way, as well as to check if the network behaves
appropriately in whichever legal configuration. In compari-
son with testing standard scan-chains [2]–[4], SIB and Scan-
Mux reconfigurable modules requires special procedures.
Eventually, when a fault is detected, it may be necessary
2to precisely pinpoint the faulty module.
This work focuses on identifying and localizing per-
manent faults affecting reconfigurable modules in RSN. In
more details, the paper presents a technique to produce a
diagnostic sequence of stimuli able to localize the faulty
element. The proposed method relies on a semi-formal
approach: a Finite State Automaton is dynamically built
and then used by an heuristic algorithm to generate a quite
effective sequence able to diagnose all permanent faults in
the target RSN. Such a diagnosis has to be complemented
with the diagnosis of remaining components of the RSN,
possibly implementing techniques [5]–[10].
Since it is common in the industrial practice to start the
test/diagnosis generation activities early in the design pro-
cess, when high-level descriptions are available only, we tar-
get a high-level fault model for the reconfigurable modules
and using it enables defining more general, implementation-
independent methods, since the standard does not impose
rules but provides only suggestions on how certain modules
should be implemented at the gate-level. Of course, such a
high-level fault model is a trade-off between the complexity
and the achieved defect coverage, and we also address
the issue of validating the used fault-model resorting to
fault-simulation. In our work we considered only RSNs
containing regular SIBs and ScanMuxes, controlled both in-
line and remotely, while additional aspects of RSNs, e.g.,
security, are not taken into account as they would render
an approach to diagnose faults heavily dependent on the
implementation of the chosen method.
Experimental results are reported on benchmark net-
works from the set introduced in [11], from [12], and on
synthetically generated circuits. Results demonstrate the
feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed approach: while
always keeping the computational cost under control, test
sequences produced on these circuits by resorting to the cur-
rent approach are significantly shorter than those generated
by the method described in [13].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we summarize the key characteristics of the IEEE 1687
networks, with a review on related works and some main
motivations. Section 3 describes the adopted fault model
and diagnostic procedure. In Section 4 we propose the tech-
nique for generating an optimized diagnostic sequence for
an RSN. Section 5 reports on experimental results. Finally,
Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section an overview of modules used in an IEEE
1687 network is given as well as the main motivations for
performing diagnosis on reconfigurable scan networks.
2.1 Overview of Reconfigurable Scan Networks
The RSN is an instrument access network residing between
device interface and instrument interface. With the possibil-
ity to split the scan chain into segments connected either
in series or in parallel, an RSN improves the flexibility
of a single scan chain in terms of access time. Although
any scan cell in a scan chain with serially-connected shift
register bits is a potential point of failure, an RSN is more
robust from the reliability point of view, since the rest of the
circuit is likely to be still operational thanks to exploiting
hierarchical structures. Moreover, RSNs offer the possibility
to be dynamically configured, thus removing the need to
use separate instructions to access a particular instrument
or a group of instruments.
To interface each instrument, a register of a variable
length is used. This corresponds to a set of scan cells,
IEEE 1149.1-compatible, referred to as a TDR. TDRs can be
Read-Only, Write-Only or Read-Write. Furthermore, three
operations are used to control the network and read/write
data from/to TDRs: capture (C), shift (S), update (U).
Apart from TDRs, the network is composed out of two
types of programmable modules. These are used to partition
the set of instruments; including or excluding a set of
instruments obviously has an effect on the scan chain length.
A segment insertion bit (SIB) module behaves as a
gateway with respect to the segment it controls: it is able
either to bypass the segment or to include the segment
into the active path (Figure 1(a)). In the bypass state it is
referred to as de-asserted, while it is said to be asserted when
is configured to expand the scan chain. SIBs can be used to
obtain a hierarchical structure of the network, allowing hi-
erarchical access to the registers interfacing the instruments.
The Figure 1(b) shows a symbol used to represent a SIB.
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Fig. 1. Segment Insertion Bit (SIB) module
Other than using a SIB to include or bypass a seg-
ment, a different module is used to support exchange of
one scan chain segment for another. A scan multiplexer
with shift-update cells (ScanMux, SM) can be seen as a
configurable multiplexer, which is used to alter the scan
chain by selecting which of its input branch segments are
to be included into the active path. Thus, the existence of
mutually exclusive scan chains is supported, reinforcing the
trade-off of access time with access length. The example
given in Fig. 2(a) shows a scan multiplexer with a two-bit
shift-update control register which is used to choose one
among four segments. The symbol shown in Fig. 2(b) will
be used to represent a shift-update cell.
Control registers of the modules consist out of two stage
cells. A cell is referred to as a flip-flop with additional
control logic. Shift (S) cell is a part of scan chain and it
shifts values, while Update (U) cell stores the S cell value,
when update operation is performed. The configuration
of the module is defined by the value in the U cell. For
example, a SIB module is configured by shifting in the
desired value into the S scan cell, followed by an update,
thus storing the value from the S cell to the U scan cell.
Indicatively, as illustrated by Fig.1(a), in this work a SIB
is considered to be asserted if the latched bit is 1 and if
so, it includes the path between tsi and fso terminals.
3Conversely, it is regarded as being in a de-asserted state if
the latched bit is 0, bypassing the segment between tsi and
fso terminals, directly connecting si and so through the S
cell. The provided shortcut has the length of one bit.
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Fig. 2. ScanMux (SM) module
Depending on the position of the configuration bit(s)
with respect to the programmable module itself the module
can be either inline or remote. A module is considered to
be inline if its associated configuration cell is located in the
same segment of the related module. Otherwise, it is said to
be remotely controlled.
Some basic architectural constructs, varying on the orga-
nization of TDRs, are provided in Figure 3. A simplest one
is a flat structure where TDR is always accessible (Fig. 3a).
MUXed TDRs enable mutually exclusive access (Fig. 3b),
while excludable TDR is either a part of the active path or is
bypassed (Fig. 3c). Partial configurations involve combining
previous structures, thus in Fig. 3d (partially selectable
TDRs) always two TDRs belong to the active path (one fixed,
another selectable), while in Fig. 3e (partially excludable
TDRs) one or two registers belong to the active path (path
always includes one, while the other one can be inserted).
The Fig. 3f shows the partially excludable and selectable
configuration (one TDR is always accessible, while one of
the remaining two can be included into the active path).
These can be combined to design more complex networks.
Although all the examples presented in this paper resort
only to SIB and 2-1 ScanMux modules with a pair of TDRs
on their branches, the approach supports a wide range
of scenarios including inline and remote modules. It can
also be applied on networks containing ScanMux modules
with higher number of input branches as well as cascaded
ScanMux modules.
a)
b)
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Fig. 3. Supported architectural constructs - organization of TDRs
The standard itself does not impose which type of exter-
nal interface has to be used to access the RSN. However, the
most common one is IEEE 1149.1 with the TAP controller.
In this paper we will thus consider that as the external
interface.
2.2 Related works
In recent years the IEEE 1687 standard and RSNs have been
subject of many research works, addressing test, verifica-
tion, security and design. However, to our knowledge, apart
from [13], this is the only work addressing the issue of
permanent RSN fault diagnosis.
As already discussed, although reconfigurable scan net-
works introduced flexibility, minimizing access time has
arisen as a potential issue. The authors in [14] analyzed
various structures with different access scheduling to es-
timate overall access time. Additionally, the same authors
developed the CAD tool to support design automation of
optimized 1687 SIB networks [15]. Based on the access
schedule and the set of instruments, the tool is able to design
a network with optimized access time and low hardware
overhead.
In [16], a general approach based on heuristics algo-
rithms and independent on network implementation is pro-
posed to test 1687 RSN modules. Techniques used to test
single elements are described and merged to form a single
test. An alternative approach based on an evolutionary al-
gorithm was developed in [17] to generate test sequence for
a generic RSN with minimum duration. The usage of formal
techniques to generate the minimum duration sequence able
to test all reconfigurable modules in the network is explored
in [18], providing a lower bound for small networks and
thus assessing the effectiveness of the other approaches.
Furthermore, the same issue is addressed in [19], where the
state of a reconfigurable scan network is modelled with a
finite state automaton. A greedy algorithm is then used to
generate a functional test sequence able to detect all fault
mapped to multiple state-transition faults.
The authors of [13] analyzed the effect of permanent fault
on RSN elements to determine diagnostic properties. The
test sequence generated by the procedure described in [16]
is further extended to enable localization of faults, i.e., to
satisfy the defined properties.
A number of works also analyze the use of IEEE 1687
infrastructure to support on-line health monitoring and fault
management [20], [21].
Modelling, verification and optimal pattern generation
is tackled in [22]. RSN formal model is presented consider-
ing structural and functional dependencies. The problem is
transformed into Boolean Satisfability Problem. The formal
method is also used for pattern retargeting, i.e., to generate
scan-in data for reconfiguration and execution of commands
in instrument access procedures. Moreover, the paper de-
scribes pattern generation method for efficient concurrent
access. For the retargeting modelled as a sequential problem
unrolled over number of time frames (CSU operations),
the authors in [23] proposed a method for calculating an
upper-bound on the number of required CSU operations.
Knowing the upper-bound is used to deal with the model
complexity for large designs and reduce the search space
while preserving the optimum solution.
Defining and verifying security properties is addressed
in [24]. In this work it is described how specified permis-
sions and restrictions are transformed into predicated for a
formal model unbounded checking.
The authors in [25] considered introducing some DfT
modifications to enable observability of shadow registers
4and update logic. Moreover, different test methods are pro-
posed for stuck-at, flip-flop transparency and bridge-faults
in the RSN.
Security in RSN is another important aspect considered
is literature. In [26], [27], obfuscation strategies are proposed
to modify the structure of the network by introducing
additional logic for controlling the state of reconfigurable
modules, as well as creating false paths to confuse the
attacker. On the other hand, other works consider validating
security properties and preventing unauthorized access by
the means of external filter module both online and fixed-
precomputed [28]–[30].
2.3 Motivations
Although the IEEE 1687 standard alleviated many problems
and resolved many issues, it has also introduced some ad-
ditional ones. Testing traditional scan-chains for permanent
faults is relatively simple, since shifting so called, flush se-
quence (a sequence of alternated 1s and 0s) through the scan
chain is sufficient to detect and even understand the type of
defect affecting it, if any. On the other hand, to test an RSN,
apart from testing the capability of FFs (comprising TDRs)
to shift, modules such as SIBs and ScanMuxes also have
to be tested. Without considering the test of reconfigurable
elements, no guarantee can be given that applying any valid
configuration will result in network changing its state or be-
ing in a state corresponding to the wanted one. The problem
becomes even more complex when discriminating between
the faults affecting SIBs and ScanMuxes is required. Even
though a number of works is focused on identifying faults
affecting scan-chain [5]–[10], little attention has been given
to resolving the issue of fault diagnosis within RSNs. The
main motivation of this work is to determine which RSN
modules (TDRs, SIBs, ScanMuxes) are potentially affected
by a permanent fault. Identifying the faulty reconfigurable
module is a challenging task given the complexity of the
current RSNs and reducing the duration of the diagnosis
procedure is crucial. Once the faulty reconfigurable module
is identified, the diagnostic procedure may be completed
resorting to techniques already available.
Although stimulating instruments and collecting re-
sponses could eventually resolve the issue of ambiguity be-
tween the modules, the functional access to the instruments
is not considered in this work. Therefore, identifying classes
of undistinguishable faults is necessary. A fault affecting any
of the elements within the same class of equivalence has the
same effect on the output, no matter which input stimuli is
applied to the network.
Since the effect of a fault observed at the output differs
depending on the module it affects, the main goal can be
divided into two categories:
• discriminating between fault-affected TDRs and de-
tecting the pairs of TDRs defined as undistinguishable;
• discovering a fault-affected reconfigurable module
(SIB, ScanMux).
In given examples, SIB module is denoted with ”A”
when asserted, while it is denoted with ”D” when de-
asserted. ScanMux configuration when upper segment is
chosen is denoted with ”0”, while the configuration with
lower segment chosen corresponds to ”1”. Remark that, by
the sake of generality, we consider SIB modules and Scan-
Mux modules with two input branches containing TDRs.
After the system reset, network is in a reset state, in which
all SIBs are de-asserted and all ScanMuxes select upper
input segment.
3 FAULT MODEL AND DIAGNOSTIC MECHANISM
Introducing reconfigurability has made diagnosis more
challenging. Apart from localizing the faults affecting the
ability of flip-flops forming TDRs to correctly shift values,
distinguishing between faults affecting reconfigurable ele-
ments is also required. The high-level fault model intro-
duced in [16] and then adopted in several works (e.g., [17],
[31] and [18]) is used as an abstract representation of defects
on network modules. Although it was originally designed
after analyzing the effects of possible stuck-at faults, it
has certain limitations regarding certain faults (e.g., faults
affecting reset and enable logic).
Faults affecting TDRs are considered at the level of a
single FF composing the TDR. In this case, a pair of stuck-at
faults (stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1) may affect the output of the
FF. Consequently, when a faulty TDR is accessed, repeated
subsequent values of 0s or 1s are observed at the output of
the scan chain. Faults affecting two different FFs within the
same TDR can not be distinguished between themselves,
at least not using only structural information. However,
performing access at the instrument level to control and
collect responses is not being considered in this work. All
stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 TDR’s FF faults are grouped into
two TDR faults, respectively. While the consideration that
the scan cells may be affected exclusively by stuck-at faults
is an important simplification, additional fault models may
be easily taken into account thanks to the high-level nature
of the approach, e.g., timing faults including slow faults
(slow-to-rise, slow-to-fall and slow) and fast faults (fast-to-
rise, fast-to-fall and fast), resulting from setup/hold-time
violations.
Although flush patterns are both sufficient and efficient
to detect defects and determine their type, they cannot
identify the faulty scan cell(s). As different flush patterns
exist, the effect of permanent faults of different type on the
inserted pattern (00110011) is shown in Table 1. Additional
type to be considered is intermittent fault. Increasing di-
agnostic resolution which is currently at the level of the
scan segment may benefit from the approaches presented
in survey [6]. Different flush sequences may be used and
failures from multiple failing scan patterns may be analysed
to trace back failures to the origin.
Faults affecting SIB and ScanMux reconfigurable mod-
ules are modelled as high-level stuck-at faults. Accordingly,
a SIB can be stuck-at asserted or stuck-at de-asserted. Re-
gardless of the configuration, a fault-affected SIB may be
permanently bypassing or including the associated segment.
The effect of such a fault after configuring the network,
is that the path between TDI and TDO differs from the
expected one (faulty path). By shifting in a sequence of
alternated 0s and 1s the same sequence will appear at the
output after a number of clock cycles different than the
expected one. Similarly, a ScanMux may be stuck-at one
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Set of possible scan-chain fault models and their effect on the inserted
pattern 00110011.
Fault models Output effect (permanent faults)
Fault-free 00110011
Slow-to-rise 0010001X
Slow-to-fall 0111011X
Slow 0110011X
Fast-to-rise X0111011
Fast-to-fall X0010001
Fast X0011001
Stuck-at-0 00000000
Stuck-at-1 11111111
of its configurations (e.g., for a 2-to-1 ScanMux, faults are
stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1, while for a 4-to-1 ScanMux, faults
are stuck-at-00, stuck-at-01, stuck-at-10, and stuck-at-11). A
corresponding input branch is always selected no matter
the configuration. The same effect on the scan path length
can be observed in this case. By shifting in a sequence of
alternated 0s and 1s the same sequence is going to appear
at the output after a different number of clock cycles with
respect to the expected one.
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Fig. 4. Examples of IEEE 1687 RSNs
According to this high-level fault model, one can per-
form diagnosis on an RSN by configuring the RSN so that
the target fault is excited, shift in the sequence of alternated
0s and 1s, and observe when it will appear at the output.
By comparing the length of the activated path against the
lengths of all other path lengths including faulty ones and
the expected one the existing fault can be identified. Espe-
cially when all applicable configurations, starting from the
initial one, result in having different path length, the above
approach is easily applicable. As an example, the high-level
fault affecting the SM in the network shown in Fig. 4 (top),
which always selects the segment connected to the input 1,
is considered. The faulty module can be excited by a con-
figuration that selects its input 0; an additional requirement
is for the module itself to be included into the active path,
otherwise the fault is masked. Configurations C8, C10, C12
and C14 (given in Table 2) fulfill these conditions. Once one
of them is activated, one can measure the length of the active
path by shifting a given sequence (called diagnostic vector)
through TDI and checking when it will appear on TDO. It
has to be noted that the total number of clock cycles required
to apply the generated diagnostic sequence, namely, cost, is
not influenced in the same manner by the choice of different
configurations from the aforementioned set.
However, it is not always trivial to localize the fault,
since different faults may result in having the same active
path length. For example, in the network from Fig. 4 (mid-
dle), stuck-at-asserted faults on SIB1 and SIB2 result in
having the same path length (9 = SIB1(1) + TDR3(7) +
SIB3(1) = TDR1(3) + SIB2(1) + TDR4(2) + SM(1) +
SIB1(1)+SIB3(1)). This issue can be resolved by continuing
to stimulate the network, until a unique sequence of path
lengths is observed taking into account the previous active
path lengths. The principle is described in more details in
the following section. Moreover, some of the faults may re-
main undistinguishable. Pairs of faults affecting a ScanMux
module with the same length of TDRs on its input branches
belong to this group. By using this approach, it remains
impossible to differentiate between stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-
1 faults on the SM module (6 = TDR4(6) = TDR5(6)) from
Fig. 4 (bottom).
The same procedure is used to the single permanent
fault diagnosis on the RSN elements (TDRs, SIBs and Scan-
Muxes). The complete generated procedure is organized as a
set of sessions, each composed of a diagnostic step and a con-
figuration step. Configuration step corresponds to shifting
configuration bits in the scan chain and performing update.
Each diagnostic step consists of the following phases:
1) shifting in the first sequence consisting of same val-
ues (all 0s or all 1s), while the length of the sequence
is equal to the length of the longest path in the
network; the goal of this phase is the initialization
of the scan cells;
2) shifting in the second sequence of alternated 0s and
1s (i.e., 0101...01), with the predetermined length of
the sequence (equal to the maximum length of the
expected path and all faulty paths). As a sequence
terminator two identical bits (either 00 or 11) are
added;
3) the last, diagnostic sequence shifts values from the
currently active path.
In a standard TAP controller, reaching the ShiftDR state
from the UpdateDR state requires visiting CaptureDR state.
Therefore, Step 1) is required when capture values are
either not defined or not considered. Each configuration and
diagnostic step can be translated into a JTAG vector-Scan
Data Register (SDR). SDR is a state command to perform
an IEEE 1149.1 Data Register scan and is defined within
Serial Vector Format (SVF). It is used with 4 arguments:
TDI, TDO, MASK and SMASK, i.e., the value to be scanned
into the target, the values to be compared against the actual
values scanned out of the target, the mask to be used when
comparing TDO values against the actual values scanned
out of the target, and mask for specifying TDI data that is
”dont care”, respectively. A configuration step corresponds
to a JTAG vector (SDR) of a predetermined length taking
into account active path, while an SDR vector corresponding
to an observation step followed by a configuration step
6contains increased number of shift operations. The latter
situation is known as ”overscanning” when scanning longer
than the length of the longest path.
Determining fault-caused modifications of values in the
scan chain and the length of the active scan path is per-
formed by verifying inserted diagnostic vector; in parallel
with observing the values appearing at the output, new con-
figuration vector is shifted in. The path length is deduced
from the position of sequence termination symbol. Finally,
applying the configuration vector demands an update op-
eration. The duration of the complete diagnostic procedure,
referred to as a total cost, depends on the duration of each
step and is composed of configuration step cost and diag-
nostic step cost, both expressed in terms of number of clock
cycles. The configuration step cost is the time needed to
apply configuration vectors. The time overhead of the JTAG
protocol is also included, since moving the TAP controller
from shift to update state and vice versa also requires a
few clock cycles. The diagnostic phase cost is the time
required to shift in the diagnostic sequence. Furthermore,
the duration of a session is determined by the length of
the TDRs included in the path, as well as by the previous
configuration.
Consideration that the TAP controller is used to access
and control the network imposes certain restrictions. The
TAP Finite State Machine with its defined transitions is able
to traverse 3 main states (capture, shift and update) in the
following order: either capture, shift and then update or
capture and then update, avoiding the shift state. Therefore,
without acquiring and applying certain design techniques
to improve the observability of such registers [25], it is not
possible to check if one shift operation destroys/overwrites
previously shifted-in data. If such defect is present, after
shifting data into some other scan element in parallel or
rather than into the desired one, some update operation
must be performed, followed by a capture. Consequently,
any previously stored data is overwritten, thus removing
any trace of unwanted/undesired access caused by the fault.
TABLE 2
Set of possible configurations of the RSN in Fig. 4 (top).
Config. SIB1 SIB2 SM SIB3 Active path Len.
C0
D
D 0
D - 2C1 1
C4 A 0C5 1
C2
D
D 0
A TDR3 9
C3 1
C6 A 0C7 1
C8 A D 0 D TDR1, TDR4 10
C9 A D 1 D TDR1, TDR5 14
C10 A D 0 A TDR1, TDR3, TDR4 17
C11 A D 1 A TDR1, TDR3, TDR5 21
C12 A A 0 D TDR1, TDR2, TDR4 15
C13 A A 1 D TDR1, TDR2, TDR5 19
C14 A A 0 A TDR1, TDR2, TDR3, TDR4 22
C15 A A 1 A TDR1, TDR2, TDR3, TDR5 27
4 METHODOLOGY
In this paper, the RSN of IEEE 1687 is modeled as a finite
state automaton (FSA) as in [31]. Each state of SIBs and Scan-
Muxes in the network, referred to as configuration, represents
an automaton state. The input alphabet corresponds to the
possible network’s reconfiguration operations. Apart from
being in relation to the fault model, the length of the active
path is an easy obtainable property [16]. Therefore, output
symbols are mapped to the lengths of the active paths.
Although the high-level model is exact in modelling the
circuit, it is deliberately incomplete, since the FSA’s states
encode only a subset of the possible configurations. Due
to the particular structural properties of the RSN, not all
transitions are possible in all states. When an input does not
correspond to a transition, the FSA is brought to a special
sink state (Ω), that is a state with no output transitions and
a null output symbol. For instance, in some networks it
is possible to use a Scan Multiplexer whose configuration
is based on the values of multiple configuration bits (n).
However, such multiplexers do not necessarily have defined
inputs for all possible configurations (2n) in the ICL descrip-
tion of the network. Even though at the implementation
level, either at the gate- or RTL-level, these pins might be
tied to some other input or to logical 0/1, to prevent any
ambiguities, transitions to such unspecified configurations
lead to a special state.
Given the stuck-at faults affecting SIBs and ScanMuxes,
the same configuration operations may result in different
network statuses on faulty circuits. Therefore, such faults
are mapped to multiple transition faults on the high-level
automaton. Taking into account the faulty automata and the
good one, the goal of the diagnostic procedure is to produce
a sequence of inputs able to make a unique discrimination
between each one of them.
A greedy search strategy represents the basis of the
proposed algorithm. Not all possible states nor all possi-
ble input symbols are considered, and, consequently, not
all possible transitions. Nevertheless, the simulation of the
automaton is exact, while any missing state or transition
will cause the automaton to reach the sink state, that by
construction cannot be further distinguished from any other
state.
4.1 Finite State Automaton
Initially, the FSA is composed of only a state with no output
transition and a null output symbol. Such sink state is used
to denote a pathological condition, where the algorithm is
not able to provide reliable results due to the approximation
of the model. This state is characterized by its ambiguity
with respect to any other state. Once entered, the FSA
permanently remains in this state.
Next, the state when all configuration bits are set to
the initial value, denoted as reset state, is added to the
automaton. Then, for each SIBi, two states are created: one
with the SIB asserted and one with the SIB de-asserted.
Similarly, for each SM, one state is created for each possible
configuration.
Such a straightforward approach, however, is not always
sufficient. Scan segments may be nested, and a resource ac-
cessible only when its parent SIB is asserted. The procedure
for building the FSA detects such situations, and creates the
necessary states to handle them. The transitions from the
reset state to all these states are eventually added.
7For instance, SIB2 in Fig. 6 is only accessible when SIB1
is asserted. Therefore, the FSA would first include the reset
state (SIB1,SIB2,SIB3), and then the three states with only
one SIB asserted { (SIB1, SIB2, SIB3), (SIB1, SIB2, SIB3),
(SIB1, SIB2, SIB3) }, finally, the state (SIB1, SIB2, SIB3).
Since we build the FSA in an incremental mode the
following modifications are performed:
• for each transition in the good automaton, the possi-
ble faulty transitions are added;
• if the faulty transition would bring the automaton in
a configuration not already encoded as a state, that
specific state is added to the FSA;
• all nonexistent transitions between existing states are
added to the automaton;
• eventually, all possible faulty transitions from all
existing states are also added, but if one would bring
the automaton in a configuration not encoded as a
state, its destination is set to the sink state, meaning
that the FSA is unable to model such situation.
As almost only the states with a hamming distance of
1 from the reset state are added to the FSA, the size of the
automaton is linear in the number of configuration bits. It
is possible to define an automaton with more states: for
instance, at some point of the creation, all complementary
states may be added as well. It is important to remember
that the size of the automaton influences both the quality of
the results and the performance of the algorithm.
While considering the possible transitions, some addi-
tional states corresponding to the configurations which may
reduce the cost are also examined. Of course, it is important
to remember that the highest priority is to continuously
increase the number of diagnosed faults, while reducing the
cost is a secondary goal. For example, states representing
configurations in which accessible SIBs that provide access
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Fig. 5. Example of generating FSA for the network from Fig. 7
.
to the deepest hierarchical level are not asserted may in-
crease the number of required sessions and therefore the
cost. Additionally, configurations in which a SIB is still
asserted while already all faults associated with it and its
sub-hierarchical modules are diagnosed may increase the
cost. If all faults affecting ScanMux and its sub-hierarchical
modules are diagnosed, the configurations in which a Scan-
Mux branch with not minimal length is included into the
path might also increase the cost. It is worth noting that,
although designers may explicitly define and include some
additional states to this state or provide additional heuristic,
experimental validations suggest that such extensions are
unlikely to be beneficial.
For the network given in Fig. 7, FSA with its states and
transitions is given in Fig. 5. The states are represented by
circular shapes with the label and output symbol, while
the lines with arrows denote the transitions between the
states. Initially, only states filled with white color (sDDDD,
sDDDA, sDDAD, sDADD, sADDD) are created. States in
light grey are created consequently, dynamically, after ap-
plying the chosen input symbols and performing transi-
tions on fault-free FSA. Remaining states, in dark grey
are created as a result of transition on faulty FSAs. As
for the transitions, some of them are created for exam-
ining the end states (dash lines). The transitions drawn
in bold lines correspond to transitions of the fault-free
FSA (t1–{sDDDD→sDDDA}, t2–{sDDDA→sDDAD}, t3–
{sDDAD→DADD}, t4–{sDADD→sADDD}). The remain-
ing transitions are executed on the faulty FSAs while apply-
ing the sequence of chosen input symbols (in solid style).
4.2 Search Algorithm
A sequence of transition and observation steps is constructed
by the search algorithm. A transition corresponds to a
change in the configuration of the RSN and it is performed
by shifting an array of bits into the scan chain. On the other
hand, an observation step does not change the configuration
of the RSN and does not affect the FSA, since it is comprised
only out of shift operations.
The goal of the diagnosis sequence generation procedure
is to make the good circuit and the faulty ones pass through
different states to be able to distinguish between them by
comparing sequences of output symbols of the traversed
states. For every circuit a sequence of scan chain lengths
TDR2
SIB2
TDR1
SIB1
TDR3
SIB3
TDR2
SIB2
TDR1
SIB1
TDR3
SIB3
Fig. 6. Example of generating input symbols for SIB RSN.
8is observed; if it is unique then a fault is considered to be
diagnosed.
Let x be an input symbol for the FSA. The reset operation
is denoted with reset, and it requires a single clock cycle
to be performed; measuring the length of the scan chain is
characterized with observe symbol. Moreover, it requires
a certain number of clock cycles and does not affect the
state of the FSA. Both concatenation of the two sequences
and appending a symbol to an input sequence are expressed
as additions, as no ambiguities are possible. The symbol ∅
denotes an empty symbol and has no effect on an input
sequence, e.g., t = t+∅. The state of the FSA is unambigu-
ously defined with a sequence t of inputs starting with a
reset, i.e., t = (reset,+t0, t1, ..., tk).
Two states that have undistinguishable output symbols
are equivalent and are denoted with s′ ∼= s′′. Conversely,
non equivalent states have distinguishable output symbols
and are denoted with s′  s′′. By definition, the sink state is
equivalent to any other state ∀s : s ∼= Ω.
Let Λ¯t be the sequence of states [s¯reset, s¯t0 , s¯t1 , ..., s¯tk ],
the FSA representing the fault-free circuit goes through after
applying the input sequence t, while Λit be the sequence of
states [sireset, s
i
t0 , s
i
t1 , ..., s
i
tk
] the FSA representing the circuit
when fault i is present goes through when the same input
sequence is applied. The two Λ sequences Λit and Λ
j
t are
considered to be different if there are at least two different
output symbols, corresponding to the same state position in
both of the sequences (e.g., sitk−1 and s
j
tk−1 ). Moreover, the
sequence Λit is unique, if Λ
i
t  Λ¯t and ∀j, j 6= i, Λit  Λjt.
Having a unique sequence Λit allows to mark the fault i as
diagnosed, by appending an observe input symbol to t.
The fault i is said to be “diagnosable”.
Algorithm 1 Greedy score step
function GREEDY(t, score)
m← ( ) . Empty sequence of inputs
for x ∈ {valid input symbols in s¯t} do
u← t
Append x to u
FSu ← (Λ¯u,Fu, score)
FSm ← (Λ¯m,Fm, score)
if FSu > FSm then
m← u
returnm . Most promising sequence
Let DF(Λ¯t,St) be the set of potentially diagnosable
faults when the good circuit traversed the states in Λ¯t and
the faulty ones St = (Λ0t ,Λ
1
t , ...,Λ
f−1
t ), i.e., the set of all
faults that caused the faulty circuit to traverse the states in a
unique Λi sequence. If an observation is performed, measur-
ing the actual length of the RSN path, any unique difference
would be observed and all such faults, diagnosed. Initially,
all faults are annotated with an identical score (equal to−1).
During the execution of the sequence generation procedure,
these values are updated with the index number of the
session in which a fault was diagnosed. If by running the
DIAGNOSTIC SEQUENCE GENERATION procedure, not all
faults from the F list are diagnosed, the same procedure
is run from the beginning, this time with the updated score
priority list.
A sequence of input symbols is generated iteratively
since in each run the function GREEDY searches for the most
optimistic input symbol for the sequence of inputs t to be
extended with (Algorithm 1). In other words, the appended
input symbol brings circuits in states where the highest
number of faults with the lowest score can be diagnosed. A
fault with a low score assigned means that it was either not
diagnosed in the previous run, or it was diagnosed before
some others (with a higher score). If no new fault can be
diagnosed by adding a single transition, the function returns
an empty input sequence.
Algorithm 2 Diagnostic Sequence Generation
procedure DPG(score)
t← (reset) . Initial diagnostic sequence
H← {t} . History
F← {all diagnosable faults} . Active faults
tscore← {−1} . Initialize fault score
while |F| 6= 0 do
g← Greedy(t, score)
if empty(g) then . The greedy failed
Append reset to t . Start over
for t′ ∈ H do
g′ ← Greedy(t′)
if |DF(Λ¯g′ ,Sg′)| > |DF(Λ¯g,Sg)| then
g← g′ . Alternative sequence
Append g to t
Append observe to t
H← H ∪ {g} . Save sequence
Remove DF(Λ¯t,St) from F
Set tscore for DF(Λ¯t,St)
score← tscore
4.3 Diagnostic analysis
According to the fault model considered in this work, it
is obvious that the faults affecting different types of RSN
modules have a different effect and can therefore, be distin-
guished one from another. The faults affecting TDRs corrupt
the inserted diagnostic sequence, changing the values of
particular bits. For example, a stuck-at-1 on a scan cell
within a TDR will result in observing only fixed values
of 1 on all vector positions. On the other hand, SIB or
ScanMux module affected by a fault may result in a path
length different than the expected one. Consequently, the
diagnostic sequence is not corrupted, but is observed before
or after the expected number of clock cycles.
Faults affecting scan cells of a single TDR are all made
equivalent. Accordingly, it is said for a fault to affect a TDR
and the fault is distinguished at the TDR instance level. The
presented approach is able to generate input symbols, i.e.,
configuration vectors that modify the state of a network in
such a way that in each session, some of the SIB modules
may become de-asserted and consequently some TDRs may
be excluded from the active path, but only one module can
be reconfigured to include a new segment to the active path.
As shown in Fig. 7, all inputs applied to the network not
affected by the reconfigurable module faults result in only
one TDR being included in the active path in each session
(0001−TDR1, 0010−TDR2, 0100−TDR3, 1000−TDR4).
9TDR1
SIB1
TDR2
SIB2
TDR3
SIB3
TDR4
SIB4
length=5 length=5 length=5 length=5
Fig. 7. 4 serially connected SIBs with TDRs of equal length of 5
Therefore, when a diagnostic sequence is applied, a session
that fails will specify the faulty TDR.
If the network is designed in such a way, that two
or more registers are located in the same segment, they
can not be distinguished using only structural information
and are referred to as undistinguishable. Diagnosing faults
affecting this sub-set of TDRs may in some cases be possible
using default capture values of the registers, since the TAP
controller has to pass through the capture state in order to
reach the shift state. Additionally, reading circuit’s default
capture values without inserting initialization sequence may
be used to distinguish faults at the level of a single bit.
However, this issue was not considered in this work. As
stated in the standard, capture values may be fixed and
predefined for some scan elements, i.e., TDRs. However,
if the scan elements are defined, not as Write-Only (here,
capture functionality is not necessary) but as Read-Only or
Read-Write, capture source may be defined as an external
signal or value from the shadow, i.e., update stage of that
register. Additionally, an approach such as the one we pro-
pose may rely exclusively on structural information (given
by ICL), before any detailed information on which types of
instruments are to be integrated and how they are operated
is available.
Faults affecting ScanMux modules may also not always
be diagnosable. If a ScanMux module has at least two
branches containing equal fixed length segments, then all
faults forcing the ScanMux configuration to always select
those branches are considered as undistinguishable.
One of the advantages of the proposed approach is that
is able to handle types of networks constructed out of
equally long TDRs placed behind serially connected SIBs.
An example is given in Figure 7, with four SIB modules
and four TDRs with the register length equal to 5. Since
it is enough to observe a difference in length, SIB stuck-
at-asserted faults in this case are easily detected. However,
distinguishing between them is a more challenging task.
Table 3 shows the configurations the fault-free and the
fault affected networks go through, when input sequence
generated by the proposed approach is applied.
As illustrated by Fig. 8, after applying reset, depend-
ing on the location of the fault affecting a SIB module,
the resulting scan chain can have not only a different
length, but also a different position of particular scan cells.
It can be observed that initially, the length of the scan
chain in case of a fault free network and all stuck-at de-
asserted faults (s¯, s0, s2, s4, s6) is 4. In this case, the position
of configuration bits within the scan chain is the same
(CB1,CB2,CB3,CB4). On the other hand, for all stuck-at
asserted faults (s1, s3, s5, s7), the scan chain is of length
9, with a different configuration bits arrangement, due to
the TDRs which are now part of the active path. In case
of s1, register TDR1 is in the active path, while e.g., in
CB2CB1 CB3 CB4
CB4CB2CB1 CB3
CB4CB2CB1 CB3
CB4CB2CB1 CB3
CB4CB2CB1 CB3
0
ҧ𝑠 𝑠0 𝑠2 𝑠4 𝑠6 (4)
𝑠1 (9)
𝑠3 (9)
𝑠5 (9)
𝑠7(9)
TDR1
TDR2
TDR3
TDR4
0 0 1 X 𝑐𝑣1 1 1 1
Fig. 8. Initial scan chain structure with conf. vector for network from Fig.
7
case of s5, TDR3 is a part of the active path. In the first
case, all four SIB configuration bits (supposed that post-SIBs
are used) are located after scan cells comprising TDR1. On
the other hand, in the second case two SIB configuration
bits (CB1 and CB2) are preceding TDR3, while two are
following it (CB3 and CB4). As a consequence of having
the same path length for pairs of different faults, at this
point no fault can be diagnosed. Faults s0, s2, s4, s6 can not
be distinguished between themselves and between correctly
operating circuit (length 4), while faults s1, s3, s5, s7 are
equivalent between themselves (length 9). Regardless the
fault, a configuration sequence cv can be shifted in the scan
chain. In cases where the actual length of the scan chain is
lower than the one of the configuration vector, not all values
in the configuration vector will be stored in the chain cells;
some of them will be “cut-off”, i.e., shifted out. By applying
the update, new states will correspond to the ones shown
in the second row of Table 3, thus allowing five faults to
be diagnosed (s1, s3, s5, s6, s7). Even though the lengths of
the active path after applying the cv configuration vector in
case of the fault-free network (s) and the network in which
SIB4 is affected by stuck-at asserted fault (s7) are equal,
the fault is diagnosed. When array of lengths of the active
path in presence of the fault [9, 9] is compared against oth-
ers {[4, 9], [4, 9], [9, 24], [4, 9], [9, 19], [4, 9], [9, 14], [4, 4]}, it is
determined to be unique.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
For the purpose of validating the proposed algorithm, a sub-
set of the ITC’16 suite of benchmark reconfigurable scan
networks [11] was chosen. Not all benchmarks have been
used since some of them include constructs which are cur-
rently not supported by our environment. However, some
additional benchmarks, considered in [13], were included
into the validation set to provide effectiveness comparison
with the present approach. It is worth noting that some of
the latter benchmarks are part of the ITC’16 set.
An in-house tool implementing the proposed algorithm
was developed in Java. The tool is first of all able to find all
reconfigurable modules, for which the faults affecting them
are not distinguishable. As already discussed, this is due to
their inability to produce a different path length. Moreover,
the tool can generate a list of sets of TDRs; faults affecting
TDRs in the same set are considered to be undistinguishable
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TABLE 3
Diagnostic procedure for the network in Fig.7
Input Fault free SIB1 SIB2 SIB3 SIB4
s¯ s@D-s0 s@A-s1 s@D-s2 s@A-s3 s@D-s4 s@A-s5 s@D-s6 s@A-s7
reset
observe
DDDD
(4)
DDDD
(4)
ADDD
(9)
DDDD
(4)
DADD
(9)
DDDD
(4)
DDAD
(9)
DDDD
(4)
DDDA
(9)
0001
observe
DDDA
(9)
DDDA
(9)
AAAA
(24)
DDDA
(9)
DAAA
(19)
DDDA
(9)
DDAA
(14)
DDDD
(4)
DDDA
(9)
0010
observe
DDAD
(9)
DDAD
(9)
DDAD
(9)
DDDD
(4)
0100
observe
DADD
(9)
DADD
(9)
DDDD
(4)
1000
observe
ADDD
(9)
DDDD
(4)
between themselves, e.g., because they belong to the same
segment.
The basic information on the benchmarks’ evaluation set
is reported in Table 4. Columns 2 and 3 give the number
of SIBs and SMs for each network. The total number of SIB
and SM configuration bits is reported in the fourth column.
The depth of a module is equal to the number of nested
modules controlling its segment. The hierarchical depth of
the network corresponds to the highest module depth in the
network and is provided in column 5. The sixth and seventh
columns represent the maximum path length and the total
number of scan cells in a given network, respectively. The
upper part of the table contains the list of networks used
to evaluate the approach proposed in [13], while the list
of considered ITC’16 benchmarks is contained in the lower
part of the same table.
TABLE 4
Benchmark networks list
Network SIB SM Totbits
Max
depth
Max
path
Scan
cells
A586710 6 0 6 2 41,972 41,972
N17D3 7 8 15 4 372 462
N32D6 13 10 23 4 84,039 96,158
N49D0 16 18 34 1 949 1,114
N61D2 11 22 33 2 1,162 1,422
N73D14 29 17 46 12 190,526 218,869
N88D8 32 32 64 4 1,637 2,013
N100D2 31 37 68 3 1,833 2,293
N132D4 39 40 79 5 2,555 2,991
P22810 30 0 30 2 30,915 30,915
P34392 22 0 22 2 23,478 23,478
Mingle 10 3 13 4 171 270
TreeBalanced 43 3 48 7 5,219 5,581
TreeFlat Ex 57 3 62 5 5,100 5,195
TreeUnbalanced 28 0 28 11 42,630 42,630
a586710 0 32 32 4 42,381 42,410
p22810 270 0 270 2 30,356 30,356
p34392 0 96 96 4 27,899 27,990
q12710 27 0 27 2 26,185 26,185
t512505 159 0 159 2 77,005 77,005
NE600P150 207 194 401 78 23,423 28,250
NE1200P430 381 430 811 127 88,471 108,148
A computer with an Intel i5-7200U processor and 8 GB
of RAM was used to perform the experiments. Table 5
reports the experimental results obtained from running the
proposed algorithm on the set of benchmark networks. In
columns 2 and 3, the number of configuration vectors, i.e.,
the number of diagnosis vectors is given. In this table, the
cost of performing the diagnostic procedure on a given net-
work by applying the generated sequence is given in terms
of number of clock cycles required to apply all configuration
steps (cv, column 4) and all diagnostic steps (dv, column 5).
TABLE 5
IEEE 1687 algorithm experimental results
Network cv dv Conf.cost [cc]
Test
cost [cc]
A586710 6 7 44,168 377,435
N17D3 15 16 3,287 9,492
N32D6 23 24 989,654 3,041,145
N49D0 34 35 20,429 55,029
N61D2 33 34 25,882 67,055
N73D14 46 47 4,883,376 13,945,235
N88D8 63 64 54,488 160,405
N100D2 67 68 73,903 200,260
N132D4 77 78 115,928 317,291
P22810 30 31 62,191 1,023,787
P34392 22 23 65,008 606,897
Mingle 14 15 921 3,591
Tree Balanced 47 48 132,172 393,223
TreeFlat Ex 62 63 184,536 515,997
TreeUnbalanced 28 29 149,021 1,386,204
a586710 61 62 75,525 2,703,562
p22810 301 302 6,472,380 15,697,407
p34392 187 188 50,712 5,296,399
q12710 25 26 34,082 716,281
t512505 159 160 190,736 12,512,221
NE600P150 399 400 4,186,745 13,563,116
NE1200P430 809 810 39,615,088 111,319, 225
A number of experiments has been run to evaluate the
effectiveness of the high-level fault model used in this work.
Selected benchmarks have been synthesised using NanGate
45 nm Open Cell Library. Synopsys tool TetraMAX1 was
used to perform fault simulation on the designs at the gate-
level by applying test sequences generated by the method
in [18]. The fault simulation results showed that in general a
high or complete stuck-at fault coverage is achieved. Certain
corner cases appeared as a result of faults affecting modules
positioned deep in the hierarchy and with the ScanMuxes
having more than 2 inputs. Finally, the stuck-at faults af-
fecting the update logic and the flipflops are either covered
or they propagate long sequences of Xs in the circuit. Since
the proposed test sessions demand for a precise sequence of
0 and 1 s to be observed on scan output ports, faults that
propagate sequences of Xs can be safely marked as covered.
1. TetraMAX ATPG User Guide, Version M-2016.12, Synopsys,
www.synopsys.com.
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By using the proposed approach and according to the
fault model which was described previously, all distinguish-
able faults were diagnosed, thus reaching 100% diagnostic
coverage. Considering the discussion in Section 2.1, faults
affecting modules that are not considered as undistinguish-
able are considered to be distinguishable. The comparison
of the proposed approach with the approach from [13] is
given in the upper part of Table 6. The lower part of the
same table refers to the results obtained on the sub-set of
ITC’16 benchmarks. The second column of the table gives
the total number of clock cycles needed to apply the input
sequence generated by the approach proposed in Section
4.2. Comparison data on diagnosis duration in clock cycles
are taken from [13] and are provided in column 3. The fourth
column shows the comparison against the current result.
The ratio between the duration of the diagnostic sequence
generated by the previous and new approach is reported,
thus showing how faster the latter one is. Due to the Java’s
non-determinism at run-time no accurate timing in terms
of CPU time for generating the sequence is possible. There-
fore, only the program’s total execution time is reported in
column 5. The number of pairs of undistinguishable faults
affecting TDRs and SMs is reported in columns 6 and 7.
As it can be observed from the Table 6, in all of the
cases where comparison data exists, the time required to
perform the diagnosis is significantly reduced, up to 43
times. Although no data regarding the execution time of the
previous algorithm is provided, it is evident from the Table
6 that the presented algorithm is efficient and fast to execute,
since in most of the cases, the required time is measured in
the order of seconds. Exceptionally, more than one hour was
needed for three networks.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have proposed a new sequence generation
technique to diagnose permanent faults in RSNs resorting
to an FSA model of the circuit and a greedy search algo-
rithm. Experimental results demonstrate that the presented
approach outperforms the previous ones in terms of number
of clock cycles required to run the generated diagnostic
sequence. Furthermore, this technique can be applied to
a wide range of network types of different complexity
since for all of the test cases and benchmark networks full
diagnostic coverage has been reached while keeping the
computation effort under control. The future work should
focus on extending the technique to support different fault
models.
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